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This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a
sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians
during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identifica-
tion. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine
civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of
conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assess-
ment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These
findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical
implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.
When officials delegate security and counterinsurgency to
civilian militias, how does this influence violence in civil
wars? Between 2005 and 2009, Coalition forces in Iraq re-
cruited Sunni tribal members to undertake security and
combat operations. The “Sons of Iraq” militia program
helped the Coalition defend local communities from in-
surgents; it played a pivotal role in the stabilization of Iraq
(Biddle et al. 2012, 19–20; Smith and Macfarland 2008,
42–48). The “Sons” provide an example of a civilian de-
fense force, which is a unique form of pro-government mi-
litia. Civilian defense forces are composed mainly of
civilians who undertake intelligence and limited combat
roles to extirpate insurgents from their community. In
comparison, other militias are often more mobile, com-
posed of a wider range of recruits—such as ex-servicemen,
criminals, and conscripts. They also undertake a variety of
different roles, including offensive operations, election ag-
itation, and private security. Between 1981 and 2007, al-
most a quarter of the eighty-three states that mobilized a
pro-government militia delegated some responsibility to a
civilian defense force. From Iraq to Colombia and from
Angola to the Philippines, civilian defense forces are a
regular feature of civil war. However, despite the fre-
quency with which they operate, scholars lack a sufficient
understanding of how civilian militias affect civil violence.
We argue that because civilian defense forces contain
members of the local population, they possess unique
knowledge of the people within the communities in which
insurgents and their sympathizers hide. This local knowl-
edge allows the militias and their state patron to more ef-
fectively and selectively target insurgents. However, using
civilians to identify insurgents provokes a response from
the rebels; rebels retaliate—and target the local popula-
tion—to deter future defections and re-establish control.
This drives a wedge between insurgents and the local pop-
ulation, increasing rebel violence against civilians. More
effective incumbent targeting, increased rebel violence
against civilians, and insurgent fragmentation triggered by
the increasingly hostile environment lead to more deadly
civil wars.
We test our arguments with a nested mixed-method re-
search design (Lieberman 2005). We use a negative bino-
mial regression model to analyze recently released data
coding the presence of all militias operating globally be-
tween 1981 and 2005, as well as counts of civilian fatalities
undertaken by rebel and government forces. Following
Lieberman’s “model testing” small-N approach, we then
offer a case analysis of civilian forces in Iraq. We use this
case to clarify our method of conceptualization and more
convincingly rule out rival explanations (Lieberman 2005,
440–42). The combined results strongly support our
claims.
We offer important conceptual and empirical contribu-
tions to the growing collection of work centered on the ef-
fects of pro-government militias (Carey et al. 2015; Eck
2015; Jentzsch et al. 2015; Mitchell et al. 2014; Schubiger
2012; Stanton 2015). While most studies tend to examine
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state delegation of violence as a means to avoid account-
ability, we make broader claims about patterns of civil-war
violence. In so doing, we provide a contribution to emerg-
ing debates on insurgent defection, side-switching, and
splintering (e.g., Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2013,
2014; Staniland 2012, 2014). By highlighting the role of ci-
vilian collaborators in the maintenance of political order,
we also speak to ongoing debates concerning the use of
social networks in imperial conquest (e.g., Macdonald
2014), as well as developing states’ governance strategies
(e.g., Ahram 2011; Belge 2011; Holden 2004; Thomson
1994; Tilly 2003). We show that while actors commonly
use civilians as a source of information on insurgents, this
leads to increased insurgent targeting of civilians and
more deadly civil conflicts.
From a policy-making perspective, this presents signifi-
cant ethical issues for those considering implementing
such divisive strategies. Supporting civilian militias in-
creases incumbents’ ability to identify insurgents and es-
tablish control, but such incumbents should take steps to
protect civilian groups in order to offset the pernicious ef-
fects of placing them at the center of armed conflict.
The Effects of Pro-Government Militias
Pro-government militias are organized armed groups that
are aligned with governments—at the national or subna-
tional level—but not identified as members of the conven-
tional armed forces (Carey et al. 2013, 250). Most studies
on the effects of militias focus on the relationship be-
tween pro-government militias and human-rights viola-
tions. Informal militias (i.e., those not officially linked to
the state) provide incumbents with a means to off-load
“dirty work” and plausibly deny extreme methods used to
target opponents and civilians (Campbell 2002, 13–14;
Cohen and Nordas 2015). Unofficial militia groups are
therefore strongly associated with human rights abuses
and civilian targeting (Carey et al. 2015; Mitchell et al.
2014, 818–19; Raleigh 2012, 463–64).
Previous research reveals how militias support weak
state institutions (e.g., Ahram 2011, 15–19; Klare 2004,
120–21). Militias offer incumbents governing weak institu-
tional structures a cheaper method to engage insurgents
(Carey et al. 2011, 6–7). In this way, a state’s creation
and/or collaboration with militias provides a nontradi-
tional means of consolidating power (Ahram 2011, 14–
15). However, weak states often lack the ability to control
militia violence (Barter 2013, 20; Mitchell et al. 2014, 813–
17). Therefore, rather than violence occurring because a
states is unwilling to control a militia, violence can also oc-
cur when the state is unable to exert sufficient control over
a group (Mitchell 2004, 46–50).
Finally, a third body of literature discusses the role that
militias can play in assisting incumbents to overcome the
“identification problem” (Kalyvas 2006, 108–9; Lyall 2010,
15). This problem arises from the challenges of identify-
ing insurgents within a civilian population (Galula 1964,
55–57; Kalyvas 2006, 89–91; Kilcullen 2010, 10–31). In the
absence of reliable intelligence, incumbents must choose
between inaction and the adoption of indiscriminate
forms of violence (Kalyvas 2006, 147–49). Given the obvi-
ous problems associated with inaction, a lack of reliable
intelligence more commonly leads to indiscriminate vio-
lence. This approach often proves to be counterproductive;
it alienates the very people the incumbent is attempting
to win over to their side (Downes 2008, 2–9). Research
suggests that militias can provide local information on
insurgents that allows the state to apply violence more se-
lectively (Kalyvas 2006, 107; McClintock 1992, 251–52; Peic
2014; Jones 2012, 15–17).
Types of Pro-Government Militias
Despite highlighting key effects produced by pro-govern-
ment militias, existing accounts fail to adequately distin-
guish between different types of militias and the unique
roles they may perform. A lack of cross-national data gen-
erally prevents the effective categorization of militia forces
and limits analysis of the effects associated with differ-
ent forms of militia groups. However, Carey, Mitchell,
and Lowe (2013, 251–53) distinguish between militias in
relation to their link with the state. They categorize
groups as either “informal” or “semi-official.” Mitchell
et al. (2014) draw on this typology, adopting a principal-
agent framework to argue that groups informally linked to
the state have a stronger negative effect on human-rights
violations.
However useful the informal/semi-official distinction, it
fails to help account for how differences in a variety
of factors—such as the recruitment base and mode of
operation—can impact conflict processes. Examination of
a broader range of factors, such as the relationship of mili-
tias with rebel organizations (Barter 2013), will enable a
deeper understanding of the effects of militias. For in-
stance, it remains unclear why militias prove better than
conventional incumbent forces at separating insurgents
from civilians. The membership composition and opera-
tional parameters of militias often differ little from those
of state forces (Carey et al. 2013, 251–53). Some groups
comprise off-duty military or police, which should offer
no distinct advantage for gaining information. Recent lit-
erature makes some inroads in discussing pro-government
militia heterogeneity, but still fails to delineate the varied
nature of these actors and their impact on civil-war dy-
namics (Ahram 2014; Barter 2013; Carey et al. 2013). This
article contributes toward a better understanding of the
impact of pro-government militias on civil-war dynamics
by focusing on the effects of one particular subset of mili-
tias: civilian defense forces.
Civilian Defense Forces
Many counterinsurgent thinkers identify civilian defense
forces as a type of pro-government militia (Galula 1964,
82–94; Jones 2012, 15; McClintock 1992, 247–49). Civil
war scholars also increasingly recognize them (Barter
2013; Fumerton and Remijnse 2004; Peic 2014). To add
to this literature, we highlight a number of criteria that
define civilian defense forces.
First, they are recruited mainly from civilian popula-
tions. Unlike non-civilian defense forces that comprise off-
duty policemen or military, ex-servicemen, or other con-
scripts with some level of military training, civilian defense
forces recruit civilian groups from within areas contested
by the incumbent and insurgent forces.
Second, civilian defense forces remain within their re-
cruitment areas. In this, they differ from mobile fighting
forces that cross from one area to the next. Along with
their civilian status, this means that civilian defense-force
members typically live in their own homes rather than re-
porting to barracks.
Third, civilian defense forces perform “defensive” tasks.
They undertake intelligence, security, and limited combat
roles concerned with the protection of their local areas
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from insurgents. They extirpate insurgents from their own
communities and deny access to insurgents from the out-
side. We differentiate civilian defense forces from militias
that actively target a variety of opponents across wide
areas. We also differentiate them from groups who per-
form other roles within their local community that are
not connected to an insurgency.
In sum, civilian defense forces are pro-government mili-
tias that harness the active participation of civilians and
defected members of an insurgency in sedentary, defen-
sive counterinsurgent roles. We contrast civilian defense
forces from “death squad”-style militias. These include
military-trained personnel that operate according to mili-
tary-style command structures; they also roam large areas
in active search of insurgents or other opponents, such as
“death squads” in Latin American during the Cold War
(see Table 1) (Mazzei 2009, 4–10). We also conceptually
contrast civilian defense forces from local vigilante police.
Civilian defense forces defend their community from in-
surgents, unlike vigilante police that identify common
criminals and cattle thieves or enforce specific legal codes,
such as sharia law. Civilian defense forces are a historically
common feature in irregular wars, from “civil defense pa-
trols” in Peru and Guatemala to Turkish Village Guards
and Filipino Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units.
Non-civilian defense forces do not represent a single cat-
egory; they vary considerably in their composition, opera-
tional parameters, and context. Inquiry into the multiple
subcategories of non-civilian defense forces, however, ex-
ceeds the scope of this article. Non-civilian defense forces
operate in a variety of contexts with diverse operational pa-
rameters, ranging from personal guards to security forces
operating in non-civil-war settings. For example, the
“Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps” protected
business interests in China and the “White Eagles” in
Serbia (a militarily organized state-led group) conducted
various attacks during the dissolution of former Yugoslavia
(Carey et al. 2015). In other words, while civilian defense
forces exhibit particular characteristics in a counterinsur-
gent context, the non-civilian defense-force category cap-
tures a variety of pro-government militias.
Overcoming the Problem of Identification
Members of local communities generally know who individ-
ual insurgents are, or at least which residents are likely to
hide them. This makes militias that comprise local residents
and insurgent defectors best able to identify insurgents
(Kalyvas 2006, 107; Lyall 2010, 1–4). Other types of militia,
such as mobile informal groups, operate away from their vil-
lages of origin and lack inside information. Civilian defense
forces enjoy a unique ability to reduce the identification
problem. We see this as part of a wider effort on behalf of
states to make their citizenry “legible” (Belge 2011). In addi-
tion to this intelligence function, leveraging civilian defense
forces provides a political tool to increase civilian support
for the incumbent.
The formation of civilian defense forces likely funda-
mentally alters state violence in civil war. Previous re-
search shows that the nature of violence—selective versus
indiscriminate—relates to control and the access to infor-
mation that this provides (Kalyvas 2006, 202–9).
According to this theory, as the level of control exerted by
a belligerent increases, the likelihood that that actor will
employ indiscriminate violence diminishes. Control is in-
extricably linked to the levels of support for that actor
and the amount of information it has. As active and pas-
sive support for an actor increase, so do the chances for
collaboration, such as through furnishing intelligence.
Greater access to local knowledge through local militias
enhances the state’s ability to selectively target their oppo-
nents and increase their control over local populations.
Indeed, Peic (2014) shows that states that support civil-
ian defense forces are more likely to defeat an insur-
gency—a result of the local information those forces
provide. Thus, we expect the presence of civilian defense
forces to significantly decrease indiscriminate govern-
ment-sided violence, as they help identify insurgents and
enhance state control. From this discussion, we derive our
first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a civilian defense force reduces
indiscriminate state violence against civilians.
The Wider Effects of Civilianizing Warfare
The advantages an incumbent gains from civilian defense
forces produce the opposite effect for insurgents. Civilian
defense forces inherently oppose the rebels. They reduce
insurgents’ abilities to evade detection and maintain con-
trol of local populations. Civilian defense forces drive a
wedge between the rebels and civilians. The defection of
civilians from the insurgents to the incumbents dimin-
ishes insurgent control; it therefore increases the likeli-
hood of indiscriminate insurgent violence (Kalyvas 1999,
269, 276; 2006, 224–26). Faced with hostile civilians and a
declining level of control, insurgents respond violently,
employing more indiscriminate forms of violence where
they have weaker levels of control (Downes 2007, 424,
2008, 251–54; Eck and Hultman 2007, 241; Raleigh 2012,
469–70; Weinstein 2007, 203–4; Wood 2010). In other
words, we expect a civilian defense force will produce an
increase in insurgent attacks toward the defecting civilian
population. This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a civilian defense force in-
creases indiscriminate rebel violence against civilians.
Civilian defense forces can also polarize local communi-
ties. This produces higher levels of violence as incumbents
and insurgents seek to gain the active, rather than the pas-
sive, support of the community. Civilians become partici-
pants in the civil conflict. They actively support and
collaborate with either the insurgents or the incumbents.
Research indicates that, in this environment, people use
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these outlets to settle personal feuds. This increases inter-
civilian violence and the overall number of fatalities (e.g.,
Kalyvas 2006, 376).
In addition, a civilian defense force can reduce the co-
hesion of insurgent movements. The probability of insur-
gent defection increases when an incumbent is better
equipped to identify insurgents and when a population is
hostile to insurgent demands (Kalyvas 1999, 275–77). As
Staniland (2014, 40–49) argues, counterinsurgents dimin-
ish insurgent cohesion by starving insurgents of local sup-
port and creating incentives for supporters to switch to
the incumbent cause. The possibility of side-switching
poses a serious threat to the strength and stability of the
insurgency. It requires the group to focus violent atten-
tion on actual and potential defectors within their organi-
zations and supporting populations (Bakke et al. 2012,
266–68; Lyall 2010, 16–17; Staniland 2012). Ethnic cleav-
ages and other social networks pervading insurgent
groups can exacerbate this process (Lyall 2010; Staniland
2014, 97). In this way, the emergence of civilian defense
forces can turn the insurgency in on itself. This increases
the use of violence within insurgent groups, as well as to-
ward its civilian support base (as in hypothesis 2).
In this respect, we argue that the initiation of a civilian
defense force intensifies violence within civil conflict. The
cumulative effect of the increased ability of incumbents to
target insurgents, increased insurgent targeting of civil-
ians, insurgent infighting, and the general process of civil-
ianizing civil conflict, is likely to produce an increase in
the violence overall. From this discussion, we derive our
final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a civilian defense force
increases the overall fatalities during civil war.
Research Design
To test our hypotheses, we apply a nested mixed-method
research design (Lieberman 2005). We first assess our ar-
guments using statistical analysis. After the primary analy-
sis, we then follow Lieberman’s (2005, 440–42) model
testing small-N approach and assess the case of the self-
defense militia in Iraq (2005–2009).
Dependent Variables
To evaluate hypotheses 1 and 2, we examine data on one-
sided violence in civil conflict (Eck and Hultman 2007).
These data provide a count of intentional and direct kill-
ings of civilians by both government and rebel agents be-
tween 1989 and 2005.1 The data only capture a subset of
civilian conflict deaths. They exclude a range of factors
such as unintentional killings, indirect deaths, and extra-
judicial executions. Thus, while our previous discussion
spoke broadly about violence, our statistical analysis
focuses only on the most deadly subset of violence in
which governments and nonstate groups deliberately and
directly target civilians.
Hypothesis 1 makes claims relating to government vio-
lence against civilians. Our dependent variable in our first
analysis is thus the count of civilian deaths produced by
the state in each conflict year.2 This produces 529
country-year observations. Hypothesis 2 focuses on insur-
gent violence against civilians. Our dependent variable in
this analysis is a dyadic indicator recording the count of ci-
vilians killed by each rebel group in a civil conflict year
(Harbom et al. 2008).3 This results in 820 dyad-year obser-
vations, including 203 rebel groups in 114 conflicts, across
seventy states. Finally, hypothesis 3 focuses upon the total
fatalities in civil conflict. The dependent variable in this
analysis is the number of battle-related deaths in each con-
flict year (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), which results in a
population of 615 conflict years.4
Independent Variable
We use the pro-government militia database to operation-
alize civilian defense forces (Carey et al. 2013). This
cross-national database captures the presence of pro-
government militias by applying a uniform coding
scheme to publically available news sources. It defines pro-
government militia as “a group that is identified by sour-
ces as pro-government or sponsored by the government
(national or subnational), that is not part of the regular
security forces, is armed, and has some level of organiza-
tion” (Carey et al. 2013, 252). The dataset identifies 331
pro-government militias active between 1981 and 2007. In
addition to the raw data, the pro-government militia data-
set includes an online relational database. This provides
the primary news sources used to code the original data.
Using this material we code civilian defense forces as mili-
tia groups that meet the following coding criteria5:
1. Participants: the group is composed mainly of
civilians.
2. Area of operation: forces remain within the neigh-
borhood, village, or region/department from which
they were recruited. Members remain in their own
homes rather than reporting to a centralized opera-
tional base.
3. Defensive role: civilians mobilize for neighborhood/
village security and limited defensive capabilities
against insurgents. This can include intelligence
gathering and denunciations of insurgents and in-
surgent sympathizers present or living in the area of
operation. It can also include direct combat with in-
surgents in expelling members of the insurgency
1Using data at the yearly level of aggregation has limitations. Often, inci-
dents of one-sided violence are not centrally planned and should theoretically
be analyzed as individual forms of political violence (Schneider and Bussmann
2013). However, disaggregating to the event level limits comparability and
presents additional data challenges, not least of which is the lack of geo-coded
militia data (Raleigh 2012). Similarly, aggregating the conflict fatalities or
including an averaged count of fatalities across a conflict discards important
detail that is held at the conflict year. In particular, cases that feature civilian
defense forces tend to exhibit important within-case variations that would be
lost in an aggregate conflict-episode analysis. We therefore prefer the yearly
counts of one-sided violence to alternatives such as event or aggregated con-
flict analysis.
2In our analysis of government violence, we assess the number of fatalities
attributed to the state in a conflict year. As a robustness check, we sum the
number of state fatalities with the deaths attributed to six nonstate groups
that are included with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data as
independent actors but also classified as pro-government militias, and the
results remain consistent. We also exclude Rwanda in 1994 as this is an
extreme outlier. However, when we include the Rwandan case, or include a
dummy variable for this case, the effect of civilian defense forces remains the
same.
3In our analysis of rebel violence, we assess only those cases in which a
rebel movement is in contest with a state actor, and we exclude all other dyads
involving nonstate groups.
4A full list of descriptive statistics is available in Supplementary
Appendix I.
5For more information on coding procedure, see Supplementary
Appendix II.
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from the civilian defense force community or deny-
ing insurgents access.
We relied primarily on the news sources within the pro-
government militia online relational database in order to
code civilian defense forces (Carey et al. 2013). On the
rare occasion when we lacked sufficient information
within the existing online database sources, we undertook
additional research into the characteristics of the group
using major news sources such as BBC World Service and
The Guardian.6 We systematically reviewed all 331 entries
for the 3 essential civilian defense-force criteria. We only
classified groups that met all three criteria as civilian de-
fense forces. Given the relative clarity of coding criteria
for civilian defense forces, identifying the requisite charac-
teristics was straightforward in most cases.7 For example,
media descriptions of the Rondas Campesinas in Peru de-
scribe their intended purpose as “to enable the campesinos
[farmers] to defend themselves against Sendero” (The
Guardian 1984, as cited in Mitchell, Carey, and Lowe
Online Database 2013). We used descriptors such as “lo-
cal,” “villagers,” “self-defense,” “defending their own com-
munities,” and “grassroots,” among many others as key
initial indicators of groups likely to fulfill all the criteria.
In total, 50 of the 331 pro-government militias met all
three criteria, and we coded each of these as civilian de-
fense forces.8 We capture the presence of a civilian de-
fense force using a dummy variable, with all country years
in which a civilian defense force was present coded as 1,
and 0 in all other cases.9
Controls
We include a number of controls to account for poten-
tially confounding variables and competing arguments.
First, we include indicators of key state characteristics that
influence the dynamics of civil violence. We expect that
democracies are more prone to suffer rebel violence
against civilians, while autocracies are more likely to in-
volve high-intensity violence and government targeting of
the civilian population. To account for this, we include a
measure of regime type taken from the Polity IV dataset
(Marshall and Jaggers 2006). The dynamics of violence
within a state are also closely related to economic develop-
ment. States with a stronger economic base are better
equipped to protect their population from rebel assaults
and less likely to require violence to gain civilian collabo-
ration. To account for this, we include a lagged indicator
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Gleditsch
2002). States that contain large populations and inaccessi-
ble terrain are more challenging to control, which could
increase the likelihood of one-sided violence. We control
for this relationship by including the natural log of the
state’s population (Gleditsch 2002) and the logged per-
centage of mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Finally, we include an indicator of the size of a state’s ex-
cluded population (Cederman et al. 2010). We expect
higher levels of exclusion to increase all forms of violence.10
We also include controls to account for key conflict
characteristics. First, to ensure that our results are driven
by civilian defense forces and not pro-government militias
more generally, we control for other militias that are
“informally” or “semi-officially” linked to the state
(Mitchell et al. 2014). As we discuss above, other militias
(e.g., non-civilian defense groups) can take a variety of
forms. Yet, in the absence of clear conceptual categories
for other subsets of militia, controlling for other groups
in relation to their link with the state offers the most theo-
retically meaningful method.11 We include an indicator of
incompatibility, based on the belief that conflicts fought
for control of the state are more often of a high intensity
and involve civilian targeting. We include an indicator of
conflict duration that records the number of years since
the start of the conflict episode. Over time, we expect a re-
duction in all forms of violence. To capture the distribu-
tion of capabilities within a conflict, we include a ratio of
the number of all rebel forces operating within the state’s
territory to the total number of government troops
(Wood et al. 2012).12 We expect relatively stronger rebel-
lions to increase the overall conflict severity, but have only
a minor effect on the violence against civilians (Wood
et al. 2012). We include the natural log of the total num-
ber of battlefield deaths in each conflict year (for the anal-
ysis of civilian deaths) (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), as
conflicts of a greater intensity might be more likely to in-
volve violence against civilians. Further, we include the
log-transformed count of civilian killings the opposing ac-
tor committed in each of the civilian violence models. We
expect increased government or rebel violence to lead to
an increase in their opponent’s use of repressive force
(Wood et al. 2012). We also include our own measure to
account for the presence of a peacekeeping operation
that can reduce the use of all one-sided violence
(Hultman et al. 2013). Finally, we include a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the conflict actor perpetrated
one-sided violence in the previous year to account for po-
tential problems of temporal dependence.13
Statistical Analysis
We present the statistical results in Tables 2, Tables 3, and
Tables 4. As all three dependent variables are counts of fa-
talities, we estimate negative binomial regression models.
Table 2 includes the analysis that assesses hypothesis 1
(government violence); Table 3, hypothesis 2 (rebel vio-
lence); and Table 4, hypothesis 3 (conflict intensity). All
results support our hypotheses.
6We undertook research using Lexis Nexis.
7Checks for intercoder reliability showed at least 95 percent consistency
between coders.
8For a full list of civilian defense forces, see Supplementary Appendix III.
For descriptive analysis of key civilian defense force characteristics see
Supplementary Appendix IV.
9We follow the pro-government militia database and consider all militia
forces that share a similar organization and political basis as part of the same
group. This approach means that in more than 75 percent of cases, there is
only ever one civilian defense force operating within a state. As a robustness
check, we replaced our dichotomous independent variable for a count varia-
ble indicating the number of independent groups within a state; this resulted
in no significant difference in our results.
10We do not include country-fixed effects on account of the low level of
within-case variation on our independent variable (e.g., 85 percent of conflicts
in the dyadic dataset always or never feature a civilian force). For cases in
which an explanatory variable is partially time invariant, the inclusion of unit
dummies eliminates “too much” cross-sectional variance and would severely
bias our estimates (Plu¨mper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 330–34; Huber and
Stephens 2001).
11We also run the analysis using a dichotomous variable to account for the
presence of all other militia groups. Our main findings remain consistent
regardless of the approach adopted. We include the disaggregated measures
of other militias as they offer additional theoretical insights.
12For the analysis of rebel violence, the ratio measures the individual rebel
organization in relation to the number of government troops (Wood,
Kathman, and Gent 2012).
13See robustness checks for a number of alternative specifications.
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Hypothesis 1 posited that the presence of civilian de-
fense forces helps governments reduce the problems asso-
ciated with insurgent identification. We argued that local
civilian militia would increase the ability of the state to se-
lectively target insurgents, lowering the use of indiscrimi-
nate violence against their civilians. The analysis provides
strong support for this claim.
Model 1 assesses the effect of a civilian defense force on
one-sided government violence while controlling for poten-
tially confounding state characteristics. As expected, the ci-
vilian defense force variable is negative and statistically
significant. This effect remains consistent when we add
controls that account for the conflict context (Model 2).
To examine the substantive effect of the relationship
between civilian defense forces and state targeting of civil-
ians, we estimate predicted values.14 The results show that
the presence of a civilian defense force reduces the pre-
dicted number of state killings of civilians from 66 to 22, a
reduction of 67 percent. This finding strongly supports
the argument underpinning hypothesis 1: when states re-
cruit civilian defense forces, their ability to effectively tar-
get insurgents reduces the intensity of state violence
against civilians.
The control variables perform broadly in line with prior
research. Militias informally linked to the state signifi-
cantly increase government violence. This suggests that
the capacity to overcome problems of identification is
unique to civilian defense groups. It also extends previous
research that links informal groups and state human-
rights abuses. Autocratic institutions, a larger “excluded”
population, and a history of civilian targeting each signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood of government violence,
whereas increased conflict duration and government in-
compatibilities reduce the likelihood of one-sided govern-
ment violence.
Moving to the second phase of analysis, hypothesis 2
predicted that the formation of civilian defense forces
would increase rebel violence against civilians. We argued









Civilian defense force 20.895* 21.156**
(0.407) (0.430)
Polity IV 0.098** 0.071
(0.035) (0.063)
GDP per capita (t1) 0.063 0.055
(0.246) (0.416)
Population (l) (t1) 0.166† 0.094
(0.094) (0.144)
Mountainous terrain (l) 0.160 0.289
(0.183) (0.255)










Insurgent relative capacity 0.239
(0.186)














No. of observations 523 508
Log-likelihood 1443.185 1409.5903
Notes: Robust Standard errors (clustered on conflict) in parentheses.
(t1)¼ lagged variable; (l)¼ logged variable. †p< .10, *p< .05,
**p< .01, ***p< .001







Civilian defense force 0.653* 0.914**
(0.325) (0.310)
Polity IV 0.101* 0.141**
(0.043) (0.044)
GDP per capita (t1) 1.063*** 0.956***
(0.237) (0.246)
Population (l) (t1) 0.047 0.090
(0.130) (0.137)
Mountainous terrain (l) 0.354** 0.298*
(0.136) (0.125)












Insurgent relative capacity 0.087
(0.131)












No. of observations 820 714
Log-likelihood 2011.1747 1898.0088
Notes: Robust Standard errors (clustered on dyad) in parentheses.
(t1)¼ lagged variable; (l)¼ logged variable. †p< .10, *p< .05,
**p< .01, ***p< .001
14Predicted values generated using the CLARIFY package in STATA 12
(King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). All control variables were held at their
mean or modal values assuming that the actor perpetrated some form of one-
sided violence in the previous year.
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that insurgents are more likely to target civilians when
they actively signal their collaboration with the state by
forming a civilian defense force. The results depicted in
Table 3 offer firm support for our claims. As with the
prior analysis, we first assess the influence of civilian de-
fense forces while controlling for state characteristics
(Model 3). We then include additional controls to ac-
count for the conflict context (Model 4).
In all models, the civilian defense force variable produ-
ces a positive and statistically significant effect on the use
of rebel violence against civilians. As we predicted in hy-
pothesis 2, the presence of a civilian defense force appears
to refocus the targets of insurgent violence and increases
insurgents’ incentives to target civilians. Substantively, the
presence of a civilian defense force increases the pre-
dicted number of insurgent killings from 63 to 153, an in-
crease of 143 percent. This effect is consistent across all
specifications including both state and conflict controls.
Additional findings also support our theoretical claims.
The intensity of one-sided rebel violence is lower within
autocratic and economically strong states and those that
contain less inaccessible terrain. This suggests that states
that are unfavorable to insurgency have lower levels of in-
surgent control and thus increase the likelihood of rebels
targeting civilians indiscriminately.
Other control variables also perform in accordance with
our expectations. High intensity civil conflicts, in particular,
those with a history of one-sided violence, are more likely to
suffer intense levels of rebel violence. A more significant “ex-
cluded” population increases the level of rebel violence, and
conflict duration has a negative effect on insurgent violence.
Informal militias again have the opposite effect to civilian
defense groups. Informal militias significantly reduce insur-
gent violence against civilians. This finding points to the in-
efficiency of state-sponsored attacks against civilians, for the
violent actions of informal groups appear to reduce rebel re-
liance on violent methods to foster domestic support.
The final hypothesis predicted that the presence of a ci-
vilian defense force would increase the overall fatalities in
civil conflict. The combined effect of increased numbers
of state-sided participants, more effective targeting of the
insurgency, and “softer” rebel civilian targets, we argued,
increase the overall intensity of war. We present the re-
sults in Table 4. As with the prior analysis, we first control
for state characteristics (Model 5). We then include addi-
tional conflict controls in a fully specified model (Model
6). In both models, a civilian defense force has a strong
positive and highly significant effect on the number of
battle-related fatalities. As expected, the delegation of
security roles to a civilian defense force appears to signifi-
cantly increase the severity of civil war violence.
Substantively, the presence of a civilian defense force in-
creases the predicted number of fatalities by 241 percent,
rising from 220 to 751 predicted deaths.
Our analysis largely supports previous research. The rel-
ative strength of a rebel force is shown to have a positive
effect on the intensity of civil conflict. Conflicts are more
likely to assume a conventional nature and violent charac-
ter when rebel forces grow to match the size of the state.
As with prior analysis, “excluded” groups increase the
overall intensity of a conflict, while a longer duration de-
creases the severity of the violence. Informal groups in-
crease the overall fatalities in a civil conflict. Presumably
their broader range of targets, wider geographic focus,
and more offensive remit inflame civil strife.15
The combined results highlight the utility in disaggre-
gating between forms of violence in civil war. As our theo-
retical discussion predicted, civilian defense forces
produce quite different effects on government, rebel, and
overall civil violence. In line with previous literature, we
find varied effects for a number of our controls. Informal
militias, compared to civilian defense groups, have the op-
posite effect on one-sided violence. Informal militias sig-
nificantly increase government violence but reduce
insurgent violence against civilians.
Those militias that are semi-officially linked to the state
do not have a significant effect on any form of violence.
These groups tend to most closely approximate conven-
tional armed forces, and it therefore should come as no
surprise that conflicts involving semi-official groups are
not clearly distinguishable from those involving only con-
ventional forces.
Democratic states are more likely to suffer rebel vio-
lence against civilians, while nondemocratic states prove
more likely to undertake government-led violence. The
nature of the regime has little effect on the overall
conflict severity. Economic development decreases the
likelihood of all forms of violence against civilians, but
only significantly reduces rebel-led violence. A greater ex-
cluded population increases all forms of violence signifi-
cantly. Mountainous terrain significantly reduces the






Civilian defense force 0.928** 1.231***
(0.287) (0.223)
Polity IV 0.009 0.011
(0.027) (0.025)
GDP per capita (t1) 0.135 0.020
(0.235) (0.164)
Population (l) (t1) 0.162 0.120
(0.111) (0.095)
Mountainous terrain (l) 0.133 0.096
(0.129) (0.084)


















No. of observations 617 583
Log-likelihood 4534.208 4220.492
Notes: Robust Standard errors (clustered on conflict) in parentheses.
(t1)¼ lagged variable; (l)¼ logged variable. †p< .10, *p< .05,
**p< .01, ***p< .001
15Predicted values reveal the conflict-intensifying effect is greater for civil-
ian defense groups than for other militia.
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likelihood of rebels targeting civilians, but has no real ef-
fect on any other form of violence.
More generally, our results show that the relative
strength of a rebel force has a positive effect on the inten-
sity of civil conflict but does not produce a significant ef-
fect on the likelihood of either government or insurgent
violence against civilians. This supports previous findings
that changing the balance of power within a conflict—
rather than specific power configurations—constitutes the
key driver of civilian violence (Wood et al. 2012).
Increased conflict intensity is more likely to produce gov-
ernment and rebel targeting of civilians, but the effect
only proves significant for rebel violence. It appears that
one-sided violence is not a reciprocal process. Neither gov-
ernment nor rebel violence has a significant effect on the
intensity of their opponent’s attacks. Increased conflict
duration reduces the likelihood of all forms of violence.
Finally, as we would expect, a history of rebel or govern-
ment violence strongly increases the likelihood of the
same actor subsequently targeting civilians.
Robustness Checks
To ensure that our results are robust, we change a variety
of model specifications and rerun the estimates.16 First, to
ensure that we have not omitted any other key variables,
we rerun our analysis including a number of additional
controls that previous research suggests might influence
the dynamics of civil violence. We add controls for multi-
ple rebel groups, democratic aid dependence, distance to
the nearest democracy, the size of conflict area, ethnic
fractionalization, and the presence of natural resources.
Our results remain robust in all model specifications.
Second, including a lagged dependent variable to ac-
count for temporal dependence can sometimes lead to in-
consistent estimates (Achen 2000; Brandt and Sandler
2012). To evaluate the robustness of our findings we rerun
the analysis using (i) dummy variables to account for one-
sided violence in the previous 2, 3, and 5 years; (ii) a count
of fatalities in the previous 1, 2, 3, and 5 years; (iii) the
“year” variable to account for any linear time trend; (iv)
year-fixed effects to account for a time trend and common
shocks; (v) a count of the years since the last fatality (along
with square and cubic terms);17 and finally, (vi) we remove
all temporal controls. Our results are robust regardless of
the method used to account for temporal dependence.
Third, using the conflict/dyad year as the unit of analy-
sis also increases the likelihood of a small selection of con-
flicts biasing the results. We therefore rerun the analysis
excluding the most deadly civil conflict years. Our key
findings are robust even when we remove the most deadly
years of civil conflict and civilian targeting from the analy-
sis.18 However, taking yearly measurements of fatality
counts over the course of a conflict also risks artificially re-
ducing the standard errors by inflating the number of
observations. To ensure that our findings are not biased
in this manner, we assess the effect of civilian forces on
one-sided violence across conflict episodes.19 The results
complement our prior analysis, suggesting that the pres-
ence of a civilian defense force during a civil war reduces
the likelihood of the government targeting civilians but
increases the likelihood of one-sided rebel violence.
Finally, civilian defense forces could result from, rather
than cause, violent contexts. To account for potential
endogeneity, we undertake matching to pair observations
that featured a civilian defense force with similar observa-
tions without a civilian defense force. This process re-
moves observations without civilian defense forces that
lack an analogue among the cases with an active civil-
ian defense force.20 By preprocessing our data in this
manner, we can assess the effect that civilian defense
forces have independent of the conflict dynamics that
might be more likely to produce such groups. We identify
pairs using the MatchIt package in R, adopting 1:1 nearest
neighbor matching with replacement (Ho et al. 2006).
This produces 189 pairs of control and treatment observa-
tions from the original sample of 529 conflict years and
266 pairs of control and treatment observations from the
original sample of 820 conflict dyad years.21 Our analysis
of the matched dataset adds further support for our hy-
potheses. Once again, civilian defense forces produce a
strong and significant effect in the direction we predicted
for all three forms of violence. This adds further support
to our theoretical claims and helps to address confound-
ing explanations related to endogeneity.
Case Analysis: Iraq
For a deeper assessment of our causal argument we under-
take a “model testing” case analysis (Lieberman 2005). We
focus on civilian defense forces in Anbar province, Iraq
(2005–2009). In Iraq, the civilian defense militias formed
here first. Anbar is also one of the regions in which they
were most active. It therefore represents an appropriate
case to assess the internal validity of our argument.
Sunni Militias and Coalition Violence
In 2004, Coalition forces lost control in Anbar. Hampered
by problems associated with insurgent identification,
Coalition military action regularly resulted in civilian casu-
alties (Macdonald 2014, 201). For example, in 2005,
Coalition forces committed approximately 500 civilian kill-
ings in Anbar province alone. The violent Coalition retak-
ing of Fallujah and the Haditha incident perhaps best
exemplifies this (What Happened in Haditha? 2008).
US military commanders changed this situation toward
the end of 2006. They harnessed the shifting alliances of
Sunni tribes that had independently begun to defect from
16The data, replication materials, and output from all the robustness
checks are available on the International Studies Quarterly Data Site. http://
www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Replication-Data, or from the authors
website.
17This is a modified version of the methodology suggested by Carter and
Signorino (2010) for binary models.
18For rebel violence, we excluded DRC-AFDL (1996 and 1997), Bosnia-
Serbian Irregulars (1992 and 1995), and DRC-RCD (1998). For government
violence, we excluded Sudan (2004), DRC (1997), Rwanda (1994 and 1997),
and Afghanistan (1998). For conflict severity, we excluded Congo-Cobras
(1997), Angola-UNITA (1993), Ethiopia-EPRDF (1989), Ethiopia-Military
Faction (1990), and Ethiopia-EPRDF (1990).
19Cases in which civilian defense forces were present in some but not all
of the conflict years are challenging to assess using the conflict episode. To
overcome this, we use a number of different measures, including a ratio varia-
ble capturing the number of years in which the militias were present relative
to the total conflict years; a dummy variable indicating if a civilian defense
force was in all, 75 percent, or 50 percent of the conflict years; and a dummy
variable indicting the presence of a civilian defense force at any point during
the conflict. The effect is largely consistent across the different measures.
20For more information on matching, see Ho et al. 2007 and Lyall 2010.
21Balance tests reveal that these pairs are closely matched, meeting or
exceeding the standard for variance. For example, all variables receive a value
of  0.25 for standardized bias (e.g., the difference in the means of the
treated and control groups divided by the standard deviation of the treated
group); this is considered a “good match” (Ho et al. 2007, 23fn15).
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the insurgency (McCary 2009). This “Sunni Awakening”
saw local Sunnis assume responsibility for security in their
community. US forces officially supported the Awakening
in September 2006 with the establishment of the Anbar
Awakening Council (Biddle et al. 2012, 19–20; McCary
2009; Montgomery and McWilliams 2009, 13, 46). In
2007, the United States established the Sons of Iraq pro-
gram to institutionalize these Sunni militias.22 With US
support, the “Sons” expanded rapidly. By 2008, 100,000
militias expanded across more than two-thirds of Iraqi
provinces, each “Son” receiving $300 monthly as salary for
their services (Bruno 2008; SIGIR 2011, 15–19).
Information from the “awakened” militias allowed
Coalition forces to effectively focus their military fire-
power on insurgents. This helped to reduce civilian fatali-
ties and increase the effectiveness of the 2007 US troop
surge (Biddle et al. 2012, 25–33; Clayton and Thomson
2014, 929; Macdonald 2014, 212–14). We depict the ef-
fects of militias in Figure 1 using the number of incidents
a month in which the Coalition forces killed at least one
civilian in Anbar province. The early phases of the coun-
terinsurgency elucidate the problems associated with in-
surgent identification. From January 2005 until the
formation of the Awakening Council in September 2006,
Coalition forces perpetrated an average twelve incidents
and thirty-two civilian deaths each month. While there
were cases of side-switching during this time, the US mili-
tary did not capitalize on information gains through these
groups until the formation of the Awakening Council. By
the second half of 2007, incidents were down by 50 per-
cent, and Coalition forces reduced their number of
civilian killings to an average of four a month.
While violence against civilians declined, the Coalition’s
ability to target insurgents increased. According to official
military figures, the combination of the Awakening and
the subsequent surge led to a 25 percent rise in insurgents
killed from 2006 to 2007 (Cordesman and Davies 2008,
525–26). Moreover, anecdotal evidence contained in mili-
tary reports details how Sunni tribal militias gathered in-
telligence to aid the US military in more selectively
targeting insurgents (Ahmed 2008, 7; Koloski and
Kolasheki 2009, 41–53; Smith and Macfarland 2008, 44–
45). According to a US military report, “Local citizens
knew most of the members of their communities and
could easily pick out those who did not belong. They
knew which neighbors were tacit or active supporters of
insurgent groups. They knew who could provide timely
and accurate information on insurgent activity, and they
gave the squadron commander vital human intelligence
essential to success” (Koloski and Kolasheki 2009, 41–53).
The Sons denounced enemies and rid the areas of foreign
fighters but also provided “a great deal of intelligence on
members of insurgent groups, many of whom were mem-
bers of their tribes” (Ahmed 2008, 7). For example, the
number of insurgent weapons caches Coalition forces
found in Anbar province went from 692 in 2004 to 1,222
in 2006 and then up to 2,111 between January and
September of 2007 (Cordesman and Davies 2008, 522).
Civilianizing the Iraq War
Civilian defense groups also affected the targets of insur-
gent violence. According to military accounts, insurgents
responded to civilian defense forces by targeting tribal
leaders and civilians who had made the switch, as well as
those who were contemplating it. Insurgents attempted to
punish them for their abdication and deter future defec-
tions (Finer and Knickmeyer 2005; Long 2008, 79–81;
Smith and Macfarland 2008, 49).
Evidence of the number of insurgent attacks that pro-
duced at least one civilian death supports our claims. As
Figure 1. US-led coalition attacks that produced at least one civilian death in Anbar
22Originally titled the “Concerned Local Citizens,” reflecting its local
defense orientation.
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Figure 2 shows, a trend in the increase of insurgent at-
tacks began during 2005 as Sunni tribes started to defect
from the insurgency (Biddle et al. 2012, 19–20; McCary
2009, 48–49). Insurgent attacks peaked in the month in
which local tribal groups formed the Awakening Council.
Insurgent attacks continued in high numbers for the fol-
lowing year as numerous tribes realigned against their for-
mer allies. During the year that followed the Sunni
Awakening, insurgents killed 637 civilians in 195 separate
incidents. This was the most deadly year for civilians in
Anbar province.
US Major Smith and Colonel Macfarland describe how
members of the insurgency “attempted to intimidate fu-
ture recruits by murdering and desecrating the body of a
local sheik who had been instrumental in our early push
at recruiting tribe members into the ISF [Iraqi Security
Forces]” (Smith and Macfarland 2008, 49). The remaining
insurgent blocks targeted tribes who had made the switch,
as well as those who were contemplating it, to condemn
their abdication and deter future defections (Finer and
Knickmeyer 2005; Smith and Macfarland 2008, 48–50;
Long 2008, 79–81). Indeed, insurgents assassinated Sheik
Sattar Al-Rishawi, one of the progenitors of the Sunni
Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program, in 2007. Many
Sons of Iraq members and those civilians who played a
role in the Sunni Awakening became victims of insurgent
retribution.
Conflict Intensification
The emergence of Sunni militias also increased violence
overall. Evidence from the Iraq war logs illustrates the se-
verity of the violence in this period. The total fatalities
(e.g., coalition, civilian, and insurgent) grew quickly with
the formation of Sunni militia, increasing the average fa-
talities from 162 a month at the start of 2005, to an aver-
age of 289 in the six months following the Awakening. As
we already discussed, the enhanced Coalition targeting of
insurgents coupled with increased rebel violence toward
civilians intensified the conflict. In addition, interviews of
Sunni civilians, militias, and former insurgents point to
the important role that insurgent fragmentation played in
this process (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009, 66, 91).
The Awakening split the insurgency and those supporting
it. It pitted “flipped” tribal militias against foreign al-
Qaeda elements as well as members of their own tribes
who still sympathized with or were active in the insur-
gency. For example, one Iraqi interviewee (as cited in
Montgomery and McWilliams 2009, 102) related that
“Some people from al-Qaeda changed their faces. They
are in the Awakening now. They didn’t join us because
they believe we are good, but to protect themselves. They
saw who’s winning, so they were with the Awakening. But
when al-Qaeda was in, they were with al-Qaeda.” Colonel
Macfarland (as cited in Montgomery and McWilliams
2009, 178) described this process: “One by one, the local
tribes are beginning to flip from either hostile to neutral
or neutral to friendly.”
As this process unfolded, infighting ensued. For exam-
ple, one Sheikh recalled how at one point not all members
of his tribe had defected from the insurgency. He de-
scribed infighting within his own tribe as well as with al-
Qaeda (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009, 81). He further
described how both sides sought to punish defection in
this period (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009, 91–94).
The formation of the Awakening Council was a “tipping
point” in this regard. As Smith and Macfarland (2008, 49)
recount, “Soon after the council ended, tribes began an in-
dependent campaign of eradication and retaliation against
[al-Qaeda] members living among them.”
In summary, the “awakened” militias and Sons of Iraq
effectively located insurgents. This helped the US military
to target insurgents as well as reduce civilian fatalities.
However, the militias provoked a response from
Figure 2. Insurgent attacks that produced at least one civilian death in Anbar province
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insurgents. Insurgents retaliated against local communi-
ties in an attempt to punish defection and regain control.
The Sunni realignment also caused defections and frag-
mentation within the insurgency and drove a wedge be-
tween the local populations and the insurgents,
intensifying the civil conflict but eventually choking the
latter out of the area.
Conclusions
In this article, we argue that civilian defense forces consti-
tute a unique type of pro-government militia and that
such groups have specific effects on patterns of violence
in civil war. Our evidence shows that civilian defense
forces decrease incumbents’ use of indiscriminate vio-
lence, but increase insurgent violence. We also demon-
strate that by making civilians the center of the irregular
war effort, civilian defense forces increase—at least in the
short run—the overall fatalities in civil conflicts. This un-
derscores the significance of civilian support and control
in determining the type and level of violence in civil wars
(Kalyvas 2006, 111–45). Specifically, in accordance with
existing research on one-sided violence against civilians,
we find further evidence that actors tend to resort to indis-
criminate violence in which they enjoy only weak levels of
control (Downes 2007, 424; Eck and Hultman 2007, 241;
Valentino et al. 2004, 386–87; Weinstein 2007, 203–4;
Wood 2010; Zahar 2000, 110).
We contribute to the emerging body of literature cen-
tered on the effects of pro-government militias (Ahram
2011; Carey et al. 2013; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell
2011, 2015; Peic 2014; Stanton 2015). We offer one of the
first systematic investigations into the effects that militias
exert on the dynamics of civil conflict. In doing so, we
also develop further insight into different types of pro-gov-
ernment militias and why and how states make use of
these differences. More generally, our arguments matter
for understanding insurgent group fragmentation (Bakke
et al. 2012; Driscoll 2012; Staniland 2014). While previous
research stresses ethnic divisions (Lyall 2010; Staniland
2012), we highlight the importance of civilian support—
both passive and active—to insurgents in explaining insur-
gent in-fighting.
Finally, this article supports the established view that ci-
vilians in counterinsurgent roles can provide an effective
strategy to separate insurgents from the local population
(Galula 1964, 55–57; Jones 2012, 15–16; McClintock 1992,
251–52; Peic 2014, 163). However, it opens significant
normative questions given the effects that this strategy
likely has on the dynamics and intensity of violence. From
a more critical perspective, civilian defense forces are tan-
tamount to a divide-and-rule tactic. The delegation of se-
curity and coercion of civilians polarizes local
relationships by forcing insurgents to respond to those
that are now actively against them. Indeed, developing
states often use civilian cleavages in this way to mute resis-
tance to processes of state formation (Ahram 2011; Bakke
2015; Holden 2004; Thomson 1994; Tilly 2003). Similarly,
conquering powers often use local collaborators in this
manner within broader social networks of domination, of-
ten to the detriment of local populations (Macdonald
2014). Our findings therefore inform military debates on
the effectiveness of civilian defense forces (Jones 2012)
and provide evidence to show that incumbent forces that
wish to use such tactics in the future should consider the
serious ethical issues involved in placing civilians at the
center of violence.
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